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23 May 1959

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Iran-USSR: Iranian officials deny that any preparations are under way for a resumption of treaty talks with the Soviet Union. They told Soviet representatives, however, that once unfriendly Soviet broadcasts cease, Iran would consider any Soviet suggestions for improved relations. The Iranians claim that Moscow is circulating rumors of a possible resumption

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of negotiations in an effort to undermine the confidence of  
Iran's Baghdad Pact partners. [REDACTED]

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*NO*  
Burma: [Premier Ne Win has told the American ambas-  
sador that his government is attempting to grope its way toward  
closer alignment with the free world without unduly provoking  
Communist China. He stated, "When we feel that our position is  
squared away, we are not going to oppose the United States on  
cold war issues." Ne Win also asserted he was basically in fa-  
vor of the governments of South Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam  
and that he would prefer taking no action against Chinese National-  
ist irregulars on Burmese soil so long as they avoid provocative  
action.] [REDACTED]

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Iran Rejecting Soviet Suggestions to Resume Treaty Talks

Iranian Acting Foreign Minister Sadr told a US Embassy official in Tehran recently that Iran has no plans to resume negotiations with the USSR on a nonaggression pact. The breaking off of the talks on 10 February precipitated the current radio propaganda battle between Iran and the USSR.

[The Soviet chargé in Tehran recently intimated that the USSR is still interested in concluding such a pact, but wants Iran to take the initiative. The USSR appears to be trying to maneuver Iran into sending a delegation to Moscow for this purpose.] Sadr told the chargé that Iran insists on the cessation of unfriendly Soviet propaganda broadcasts before further Soviet proposals can be considered. Once the broadcasts cease, Iran would be willing to listen to any suggestions the USSR desires to make.

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In a separate discussion with a US Embassy official, Director General Afshar of the Iranian Foreign Ministry said he believes that the USSR will continue to try to undermine the confidence of the other Baghdad Pact members in Iran by circulating reports that Iran is looking for an opportunity to resume treaty talks.

The fact that the Shah undertook negotiations with the USSR in January without consulting his allies raises doubts as to the sincerity of the above statements. [At the time Iran signed a bilateral defense agreement with the United States, there was the unwritten understanding that Iran would not conclude a non-aggression treaty with the USSR.]

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Meanwhile, the secretary general of the UN has taken up with Gromyko in Geneva complaints which he has received from Iran regarding Soviet propaganda broadcasts.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Ne Win Reiterates Wish to Bring Burma Into Closer Association  
With West

[In a long conversation with Ambassador McConaughy just prior to his return to the US for consultations, Prime Minister Ne Win reconfirmed his government's policy of groping its way toward closer alignment with the free world without unduly provoking Communist China. These remarks were made in the course of a general discussion of US aid, but they were in keeping with views he has long been known to hold.]

[Ne Win said that once his government gets "squared away"-- that is, after the insurgent problem has been eliminated and a final effort made to reach a border settlement with Communist China-- "we are not going to oppose the United States on cold-war issues." He added that he is basically in favor of the governments of Korea, Nationalist China, and South Vietnam and would prefer not to take action against the Chinese Nationalist irregulars on Burmese territory as long as they avoid attacking Burmese people and do not cross the border into Communist China. Ne Win further asserted that he does not consider the "Chiang Kai-shek government" a government in exile and admitted that, contrary to the official Burmese position, he believes it would be a catastrophe for Taiwan to come under Chinese Communist control.]

[When asked whether the government which succeeds him could be counted on to maintain any movement toward the West he set in motion, Ne Win said that if the Ba Swe - Kyaw Nyein faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League wins the elections scheduled to be held in early 1960, policy continuity would be assured. Ne Win said that if U Nu were unexpectedly returned to power, "all bets would be off." He clearly considered this unlikely, however, and other unfavorable remarks he made regarding Nu strongly suggest that the prime minister and his army colleagues would go to great lengths to prevent Nu's reassumption of power.]

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**The Secretary of the Treasury**

**The Department of State**

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**The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**Commandant, United States Marine Corps**

**The Director, The Joint Staff**

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